GEM

Paraphrase before communicating to anyone

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1884

Bucharest via War

Dated January 6,1946

Rec’d 12:13 a.m.,7th

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Secretary of State,

Washington

18, January, 1946, 6,10 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

Vyshinski’s maneuvers in the last two days have given little encourage­ment to the hope that the Soviets intend to carry out the Moscow agreement in full good faith. The Peasant Party selected Ion Mihalache and the Liberals Constantine Bratianu, nephew of the party leader. There is reason to believe that the govt would have accepted these candidates but Vyshin-ski behind our backs evidently instructed the govt to reject them. (Sent to the Dept as 18, repeated to London as 1 and Moscow as 4).

The commission had a somewhat stormy meeting with the members of the govt in which the govt attempted to defend their retention of these candidates. The principal charge levelled against Mihalache was that he had volunteered to fight the Russians in July of 1941 under the banner of Hitler which proved his undemocratic and Fascist tendencies. It seems that he served for three weeks and he was released from the Army on Aug. 7. Tatarescu sat by unblushing despite the fact that he made a speech at the time calling the war for the return of Bessarabia a „holy war”. The objection to Bratianu proved to be that he was a reactionary and as Secretary General of the Liberal Party was morally responsible for and in fact under indictment for the murders of the Nov. 8 incident.

In the discussion it became evident from the general attacks level against the parties and all their principle leaders that the govt has no real intention of allowing the two historic parties a fair chance to put up candidates in connection with the election. It seems clear that they would like, if they can get away with it, to persecute and discredit by any means the leading members of the parties.

As the charge against Mihalache was new to Clark-Kerr and myself and was documented with letters to him from the War Ministry, we could take no exception at the time. In connection with the rejection of Bratianu, we made it plain that we did not accept the accusation of culpability of himself or the parties for this incident. However as Vyshinski supported the govt in the rejection of these two candidates,there was nothing to do but adjourn the meeting for discussion within the commission itself.

Prior to the commission meeting, I looked up the charges against these two men. Bratianu had not been indicted but only called as a witness in the investigation. As there is a law confiscating the property of these who volunteered in the war, Mihalache’s case had been considered by the govt some month ago but as a result his properties were not confiscated. It seems that he was a reserve officer of the rank of major within the call age but as there was a law that no Rumanian could volunteer in the army who was subject to call, he could not volunteer. In the evidence submitted by the govt to us no communication from Mihalache was produced, only copies of govt communications to him. Mihalache claims that Antonescu for political reasons had attempted just before the beginning of the war against Russia to induce him to join his staff and had even offered him a position in the govt. This had been refused but Mihalache was afraid that when called up he would be assigned to Antonescu’s staff. He contends that to avoid this he requested combat duty. He further contends that soon as Bessarabia was liberated, he urged Antonescu not to cross the Dneister and, thought unsucessfull in this, his resignation from the army was accepted.

I presented the above in connection with both men to Vyshinski at our commission meeting. I took a strong position that, based on the evidence at our disposal, we could only place the blame for the Nov. 8 incident on the members of the govt and others than the historic parties. Vyshinski however, maintained his objection to both men. In the case of Bratianu, he brought up also his activities with the Radescu Govt and implied.without giving specific evidence, that he was implicated with General Radescu in the Feb. 28 plot. In the case of Mihalache, he argued that he could not accept a man who had wanted to fight the Soviet Union and would not acknow¬ledge any difference between participation in the liberation of Bessarabia and the invasion of „other” Soviet territory. He also pointed out that he had mentioned Mihalache’s name as unsatisfactory at one of the meetings in Moscow.

It seems clear that Vyshinski’s objections are really that he does not propose to agree to any candidate who has a popular following or is a proeminent leader in either of the two parties. When we pressed him for suggestions of candidates he mentioned two professors who were respected members of the parties and, although active members, were is no sense leaders. For the Liberal Party he suggested Professor Danielopol who had been Minister of Health of the Radescu Govt and for the Peasant Party he suggested Professor Zane.
In spite of the fact that he felt Vyshinski was not acting in good faith and was attempting to discredit the leadership of both parties as far as he could, Clark-Kerr and I believed we had to accept Vyshinski’s veto. Vyshin¬ski agreed, however, that from now on the discussion of candidates will be within the commission without participation of the govt, and Clark-Kerr and I undertook to attempt to obtain additional names from the two parties.

We had a long talk with Maniu yesterday afternoon. After showing much resentment, as he considers Mihalache his strongest and most honorable colleague, he agreed to consult his party committee and, if his committee agreed, to submit additional names. I intend to see Bratianu this morning.

There is no doubt in my mind that Vyshinski intends to use every method to make difficult any real participation of the two parties in the election and to support the govt in similar tactics. In our discussions I have made it plain that the two parties must be given full right to put up candidates and conduct a campaign. To this Vyshinski has readily given lip service.

„În Europa se naşte o competiţie între două căi de gândire alternativă faţă de austeritate. Una care încearcă să limiteze efectele Pactului de stabilitate al Zonei Euro. Cea de-a doua, care caută o alternativă la el. Prima e reprezentată de o nouă generaţie de modernizatori cum e prim-ministrul danez Helle Thorning-Schmidt, aflat la putere din septembrie anul trecut, sau liderul social-democrat român Victor Ponta, care are de făcut faţă alegerilor în noiembrie. Ambii apelează la o strategie precaută care combină alianţa cu parteneri progresişti, care să asigure o bază electorală solidă, şi o agenda reformistă care să ofere creştere pentru mediul de afaceri şi să declanşeze schimbări în mediul guvernamental” arată publicaţia americană.

After the Third Way: Progressive Alternatives to European Austerity

by Matt Browne

Over a decade ago, 13 of the then 15 member countries of the European Union were led by progressive governments. Today, austerity politics dominates, and Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour parties are in opposition in all but 3 of the Union’s now 27 member states. As a consequence, a fervent debate is taking place about the future of European progressive politics. Traditionalists are calling for a return to core values and a more aggressive role for government, while revisionists assert that further modernization should provide the progressive alternative, drawing on the skills and resources of a broader range of actors. Whichever view prevails could determine not just the fortunes of progressive politics on the Continent, but also the direction of the European project itself.

At the center of the current debate is a battle over the legacy of the Third Way. Was this an unprincipled election strategy and unnecessary accommodation with neoliberalism? Or, as its architects assert, was it a genuine and authentic modernization of social democracy for the time, one that recognized a hostile right-wing media necessitated a new style of politics just as demographic, economic and social evolutions necessitated new policies? Advocates of the first view, such as former UK Labour Party leader Roy Hattersely, claim it was the betrayal of core constituencies and core values that caused the current exile from power. In response, they call for a refocusing on the central state as driver of social change and greater distribution of wealth.

As Former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband notes, this argument is appealing because it reassures people that nothing has changed, and that progressives don’t need a fundamental rethink of their politics. It helps us feel good without obliging us to try and do good. Unfortunately, it’s wrong. In his recent contribution to the debate, former UK Treasury Secretary Liam Byrne has illustrated that centralized state power is rarely the best or most effective vehicle for delivering public goods. Moreover, in the medium term, the capacity of the state to finance many of these services must also be re-evaluated. For the foreseeable future, progressives will need to promote social entrepreneurialism and a new partnership between an empowered local government and active citizens, focusing spending where it matters most, such as early years’ education.

Today, even among its architects, defense of the Third Way is nuanced. At a recent dinner in Washington, D.C., Peer Steinbrück, the former German Finance Minister and one of three possible Social Democratic candidates for Chancellor in 2013, reminded British and American guests of their naivety regarding the importance of manufacturing to domestic markets and the importance of financial regulation. Similarly, a politics that focused on occupying the center-ground, and message control and sound-bites did little to motivate party members and supporters, and seems rather outdated an era of dominated by new social media and movements.

So, is there a credible progressive alternative to austerity? If so, is it attractive enough to mobilize a winning electoral constituency?

In Europe, two competing approaches are emerging: one that operates within the confines of the recent Eurozone stability pact; a second that seeks to provide an alternative to it. The first is epitomized by a new generation of modernizers such as the Danish Social Democrat Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, elected in September last year, and the leader of the Romanian Social Democrats, Victor Ponta, who goes to the polls in November. Both favor a cautious political strategy that combines a formal coalition with progressive partners to assure a broad base of electoral support with a targeted reform agenda to spur business growth and trigger government reform. The second is embodied in François Hollande’s candidacy to become President of France. This strategy is based on mobilizing broad support for the socialists by securing their left flank withpromises to increase investment in economic growth and reform Europe’s stability pact into growth pact.

While the approach of the new moderates may appear less ambitious, it offers a real and credible alternative. It is also popular with electorates tired of grandiose promises. Hollande’s strategy, despite its popular appeal, also entails a dual risk. The Eurozone appears to be in recovery — asFarheed Zakari notes. If Hollande is seen to jeopardize this, either by the electorate or the markets, he could be punished at the polls. This, one suspects, is the gamble that Merkel and Sarkozy are making. And, even if Hollande wins, a treaty revision requires unanimity among the European Union member states.

A fourth progressive government in office is a step forward, but however admirable a goal it may be, reform of the stability pact will remain beyond the reach of Europe’s progressive for the foreseeable future.

sursă: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-browne/after-the-third-way-progr_b_1291818.html

I have underscored in the previous posts that the interpretation which attributes the authoritarian nature of Middle Eastern regimes to the “intrinsical” nature of Islamic precepts is fallacious and misleading. Rather, the roots are to be found in the tradition of the empires, followed by a period of colonial rule and ultimately by the rise of post-independence regimes that soon acquired deeply authoritarian features. Since a timeline that would go as far as the empires is beyond the scope of this paper, I will focus on how the post-independence regimes delineated the path of the current authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

As proved in the section that discussed Rule of Law, post-independence regimes replicated the tight control of the colonial rule, both due to practical reasons and because that was the most immediate and convenient model to follow. Therefore, the newly-risen regimes wielded firm control over the educational and judicial systems, the religious establishment and all forms of organized groups. Equally significant, they held monopoly over the terms of public discourse and debate and left no space for the manifestation of opposition. As Roger Owen pointed out, “no regime was prepared to share power with more than a limited number of chosen collaborators, organized opposition was ferociously crushed and all rulers were careful to cultivate an atmosphere of arbitrariness and fear.[1]”

What made possible the exercising of such a firm grip? The answer resides in the dramatic need for rapid development and more equitable distribution of income in the wake of independence. This paved the way for the adoption of a socialist discourse (yet different from the Soviet meaning), with a clear emphasis on the policies of socialist planning. Consequently, regimes in the Middle East “embarked on a statist, integrative program of national development and control” that conferred them an appearance of legitimacy. In its turn, this self-arrogated role of “masters of modernization” justified the strong moves towards power-centralization and interference in the social structure. 

Needless to say, the Middle Eastern political and social context has suffered many transformations over the decades. Nonetheless, the authoritarian path initiated after independence grew stronger and stronger. One of the most recent Freedom House researches points to the Middle East as the region with the lowest average score (5.5) in the world in terms of democratic features.[2] Yet while this ranking stands as palpable evidence of the region’s poor show of democratic requirements, the particular Middle Eastern countries have embarked on two quite different types of “trips”.

The late eighth century is a time of increased contact with the Orient; locally made bronzes and a few imports of ivory and bronze suggest a growing trade with the Levant at this time. One such import, apparently from Phoenicia, is the alphabet. After five hundred years of illiteracy, we have evidence that the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, were
writing again. Some of the earliest examples of writing in mainland Greece come from the sanctuary of Zeus on Mount Hymettos and on a Geometric jug from a grave in the Kerameikos.
The earliest examples include alphabets, which people practiced before rapidly moving on to use their new skill to write rude remarks about their acquaintances. To this same time, late in the eighth century, can be dated the beginnings of Greek literature, with the writings of the Boiotian Hesiod and the epic poems of the Ionian bard Homer.
Hesiod wrote not only a theogony but also an account of the hard agricultural life in his native Askra, not far from Thebes. The great epics attributed by the Classical Greeks to Homer, the Iliad and Odyssey, are thought to have
been composed in their final form in the late eighth century, though they ref lect the heroic past
of the Bronze Age.

Athens played no large role in these origins of Greek literature, though the city’s artists and craftsmen were among the first to decorate their pottery with Homeric scenes. The epics became a source of artistic inspiration for narrative
art for centuries.
The archaeological record for the early seventh century is extraordinarily meager when comparedto that of the eighth and suggests that Athens was in a severe decline in the years around and just after 700. The early seventh century is perhaps the only period within a span of several centuries in which the Athenians imported more pottery than they exported. There are fewer graves in both Athens and Attica, and a large drop in the number of wells in Athens. As the city sent out no colonies at this time, we must look elsewhere for an explanation of this decline and apparent drop in population.

The likeliest cause may be a severe drought late in the eighth century, accompanied by famine and epidemic disease—
a combination of disasters which affected Athens until well on in the seventh century. Most of the wells in the area of the Agora were abandoned in the late eighth century while an especially large number of votives were dedicated at the
sanctuary of Zeus Ombrios, a weather god worshiped on Mount Hymettos. The sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron also shows signs of intense activity at this time, and the foundation legend associates her cult with drought and famine.
Pottery made in the seventh century takes off in a completely new direction from the geometric designs of the eighth century. Early on, while Athens is still recovering, the graves in the Kerameikos show a respectable proportion of pieces imported from nearby Corinth.

These are decorated with friezes of animals, birds, and mythical creatures such as sphinxes, griffins, and chimaeras, which seem to owe their inspiration to the Orient. In Athens the local Geometric pottery gives way to a period of exuberant experimentation in style, technique, subject matter, and scale. Mythological scenes begin to make a significant appearance in the “proto-Attic” style which f lourished throughout the seventh century.
From the west cemetery at Eleusis we have a huge amphora (1.42 meters high), decorated with scenes of Perseus killing the gorgon Medusa and Odysseus blinding the cyclops Polyphemos. And a cemetery near the west coast of Attica at Vari has produced some of the largest decorated vases of the seventh century, including one showing Herakles rescuing Prometheus and another of Herakles killing the centaur Nessos. Other archaeological material, such as monumental sculpture or substantial architecture in stone, does not appear in Athens or Attica much before the end of the seventh century. A few scraps of baked terracotta roof tiles with painted decoration found on the Acropolis, along with two poros limestone column bases, may be remnants of an early temple to Athena dating to around 620– 600.
We have little information from literary sources for Athens at this period, though there is a tradition that the chief magistracy (the archonship), which had been a lifetime office, was changed to a ten-year term starting in 683. This change in leadership was perhaps an attempt to resolve a conf lict between aristocratic families for control of the city. Later in the seventh century we learn of a formal body of law which was drawn up by one Drakon in the years around 621.
This new code included a series of laws on homicide which remained in force for centuries; copies were carved on a marble stele late in the fifth century B.C. and set up on display in front of the Royal Stoa in the Agora.
Also to the seventh century can be dated an early attempt to set up a tyranny by the Olympic games victor Kylon with the help of his father-in-law, Theagenes, tyrant of neighboring Megara. The coup failed and, though they had taken refuge under the protection of Athena on the Acropolis, many of Kylon’s followers were killed by members of the Alkmaionidai, a powerful Athenian aristocratic family.

All three of these developments— a change in ruling tenure, a codified body of law, and an attempted tyranny—can be seen as significant changes indicative of an evolving political system, though the details, impulses, and results remain obscure.
One other important element in the creation of Athens was the annexation of Eleusis (see figs. 254– 257). Along with the town and territory, the Athenians also gained control of the sanctuary of Eleusinian Demeter. This was her principal cult place in Greece and of panhellenic significance. As the goddess of veg-etation and fertility of the land, Demeter was an extremely important deity to the agricultural society of early Greece. The date of the takeover is disputed, but it seems to have been some time in the seventh century. The Homeric Hymn to Demeter contains no suggestion that Eleusis is not an independent entity; Athens does not figure in the story at all.

By the sixth century, however, the town and its territory were fully integrated into the Athenian state, which administered the sanctuary and the mysteries celebrated in honor of Demeter and her daughter, Kore (Persephone).
To the eighth and seventh centuries belongs the earliest archaeological evidence of worship in many of the sanctuaries in Attica which in later times were adorned with handsome temples and sculptures. In the early period, cult activity is expressed in modest votives, usually clay plaques, bronze figurines, miniature vases, and small items of jewelry in
ivory, bone, or semi-precious stones. In addition to Eleusis and Brauron, mentioned above, such manifestations appear in the sanctuary of Athena at Cape Sounion.

The early cemetery at Tsepi, near Marathon, consists of well-built large family tombs,each with a slab roof and small doorway, marked off as a private plot by rows of largerounded stones. As each member of the family was buried in the stone-lined chamber, thebones of those interred earlier were somewhat unceremoniously piled up in a corner. Thearea of Athens, in particular the Acropolis, which had been attractive to Neolithic cave12 PREHISTORIC PERIOD88. Early Bronze Age tombs at Tsepi (Marathon), ca. 2500 b.c.[To view this image, refer tothe print version of this title.]dwellers, seems to have been less appealing to the seafarers of the early Bronze Age. Thesepeople were probably not Greek speakers, for one of the most enduring and conservativeaspects of the countryside—the toponyms—are not, linguistically speaking, Greek. Wordsending in -ssos, -ttos, and -nthos are pre-Greek and must have been adopted from the earlyindigenous people who occupied the land, remembered in later myth as Pelasgians, Lelegians,or Carians. Just as many Native American names survive today to remind us of theindigenous population of North America before European colonization, so too for Athens.The very names of the mountains (Hymettos, Lykabettos) and rivers (Kephisos, Ilissos)take us back to the earliest memories of Athens and Attica, a time before the arrival of theGreeks.

In around 2000 B.C. new people came into Greece and Attica, apparently by land andfrom the north: the word for sea (thalassa) is also pre-Greek and must have been borrowedfrom the seafarers of early Bronze Age times. The newcomers brought with them five innovationswhich allow us to recognize them as a different and distinct culture: a new styleof architecture, making use of houses with curved or apsidal ends; new burial customs,with individual rather than communal graves; new pottery: of a gray fabric, sharply angled,and made on a potter’s wheel; the horse; and the Greek language.There are no written records from this period(2000–1600), so we are dependent onthe archaeological evidence, which suggeststhat Attica was extensively occupied.Athens, too, was settled, andnumerous graves and wells havebeen found, both on the Acropolisand around the citadel.

With these newcomers cametheir gods, presumably theOlympian deities that are familiarfrom the historical period.

Athens became the city of Athena, daughter of Zeus, warrior goddess and protector of thecity. When depicted in later times she is usually shown full-armed with helmet, shield, andspear. Her breastplate was a goatskin (aegis) with snakes along the edges and the head ofthe gorgon Medusa set in the middle. She was chosen as patron of Athens after a contestwith her uncle Poseidon. Athena was thought to have had a hand in building the Acropolis;one tradition explains Lykabettos as a piece intended to further fortify the citadel butdropped by the goddess. She also gave the olive tree to Athens, and both the olive sprig andher favorite bird, the owl, were used in later times to decorate the coinage of the city.

The succeeding period, known as the Late Bronze Age (1600–1100), is the great ageof Greek myth and legend, the Heroic Age. To this period the Classical Greeks assigned theLabors of Herakles, the Trojan War, the voyage of the Argo, the story of Oedipus, and the expeditionof the Seven against Thebes, to name but a few. Numerous Athenian myths are attributedto this period as well. Attica was thought to have been organized in early times byKing Kekrops into twelve cities:

According to Philochoros, because the country was raided from the sea by Cariansand from the land by Boiotians (then called Aones), Kekrops was the first tobring the population together in twelve cities. These were Kekropia, Tetrapolis,Tetrakomoi, Epakria, Dekeleia, Eleusis, Aphidna, Thorikos, Brauron, Kytheros,Sphettos, and Kephisia. (Strabo 397C)

Of the sites on the list which are securely located (Tetrapolis, Eleusis, Aphidna, Thorikos,Brauron), all have significant Late Bronze Age remains, whereas two sites which are notlisted, though they were important in later times (Rhamnous, Sounion), have minimalBronze Age material. Archaeology would therefore seem to indicate that there is a core oftruth in these early legends which permits us to regard them with some confidence as partof the history of the city. In addition to Kekrops, Athenian legend preserves the names oftwo other significant early Athenian kings: Erechtheus and Theseus.

Erechtheus is one of the earliest legendary kings of Athens and was regarded as thefounder of the Panathenaic festival. A warrior king, he fought King Eumolpos of neighboringEleusis, a contest he eventually won, though it took the sacrifice of one of his daughtersto ensure success. Euripides’ play Erechtheus has Athena herself foretelling the constructionof a temple in his honor.

Theseus, a generation or solater than Erechtheus, was theson of the king of Athens,Aigeus, though he was broughtup in Troizen, the ancestralhome of his mother. As a youngman he made his way to Athensto claim his inheritance, havingmany adventures en route as hecleared the road of assorted brigands.These youthful deeds make up asort of parallel to the Labors of Heraklesand were a favorite theme for Athenian sculptorsand pot painters in later times. When he arrived inAthens, Theseus was sent to Crete for his most renowned exploit, the slaying of the Minotaurin the labyrinth. When he later assumed the kingship of Athens, Theseus is thought tohave carried out a crucial political reform, the unification of Attica (synoikismos), withAthens as the capital. The procedure is described by Thucydides (2.15):

For in the time of Kekrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, Attica hadbeen divided into separate towns, each with its town hall and magistrates, andso long as they had nothing to fear, they did not come together to consult withthe king, but separately administered their own affairs and took counsel forthemselves. Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, for example,the Eleusinians with Eumolpos did upon Erechtheus. But when Theseus becameking and proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, he notonly reorganized the country in other respects but abolished the councils andmagistracies of the minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into unionwith what is now the city, establishing a single council and town hall, andcompelled them, while continuing to occupy each his own lands as before, touse Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, since all were now payingtheir taxes to it, and it was such when Theseus handed it down to his successors.

The archaeologicalevidence seemsto confirm this traditionin broad outline.In the years around1400 B.C. the LateBronze Age settlementsare well scatteredthroughout Atticaand were equallywealthy, to judge fromthe finds. Most significant,perhaps, theelaborately constructedtholos, or “beehive,”tombs, which denotea substantial degreeof wealth and authority,are also found scatteredthroughout Attica:at Menidhi, Marathon(see fig. 259),and Thorikos (thoughnone are yet reportedfrom Athens itself ).Largely plundered inantiquity, these tombshave nonetheless producedsigns of richgrave goods: a goldcup (Marathon), anivory lyre (Menidhi), and carved gemstones (Thorikos). By 1250, however, we find theAcropolis of Athens massively fortified—also a probable indicator of wealth and power—whereas none of the other Attic Bronze Age sites, though several are f lourishing, is fortified.It appears, in short, as though the scattered and equally wealthy settlements of 1400had by 1250 become part of a single political unit with Athens and the Acropolis as its dominantcenter. The synoikismos was an essential step in the development of later Athens;

The city itself, according to Thucydides, lay south of the Acropolis in the early period.This is in marked contrast to his own day, when the Agora was the focal point and center ofthe city, northwest of the Acropolis. Once again, we have reason to place some trust in theselater accounts of early Athens, for excavation has revealed far more early material south andsoutheast of the Acropolis than the cemeteries and limited occupation encountered in thedeep layers beneath the Classical Agora to the north. The graves of the Agora area are ofmore modest construction than their contemporaries in Attica, being rock-cut chambertombs rather than built tholos tombs. The richest, however, like the tholos tombs containremnants of considerable wealth, in the form of ivory vessels, gold adornments, andbronze weapons.

As noted, the citadel of the Acropolis was defended by a huge circuit wall, built of immensestones and rising as much as 8 meters in height. So massive was this wall that it wasbelieved by Classical Greeks to have been built by Cyclopes, or giants. The assumption isthat this wall protected a palace like the ones referred to in the Homeric epics and knownfrom archaeological work at Mycenae, Tiryns, Pylos, and Thebes. Later occupation and extensiveuse of the Acropolis as a sanctuary in the Archaic and Classical periods have removedall but the slightest traces of such a palace at Athens. A few short stretches of retainingwalls and a single limestone column base are all that survive.

Like the citadels at Mycenae and Tiryns, however, the Acropolis of Athens was providedwith a secret water-supply system which allowed defenders within the walls to withstanda long siege. This takes the form of a staircase consisting of eight f lights of stepswhich led from the north edge of the Acropolis deep down into the rock to a hidden spring.The staircase, which collapsed and was filled up at the end of the Bronze Age, was excavatedin the 1930s; it descends 25 meters into the fissure. A secondary line of fortificationapparently ran around the lower slopes of the Acropolis, probably bringing other sources ofwater within safe reach of the citadel. Known from several literary sources and inscriptionsas either the Pelargikon or Pelasgikon, no part of this early lower wall has ever been found,and it may not have survived, though the area it enclosed was a recognizable entity in thesixth and fifth centuries B.C.

The loss of the palace has also removed possible contemporary written accounts ofAthens in the Bronze Age. At other palace sites—Mycenae, Pylos, Thebes, Knossos—archives written in a primitive form of Greek known as Linear B are preserved on claytablets, carrying records of various administrative transactions. The Homeric epics, how-Late Bronze Age 191213, 1415ever, do preserve a memory of both the palace and the early worship of Athena on theAcropolis:

And she [Athena] made him [Erechtheus] to dwell in Athens, in her own richsanctuary, and there the youths of the Athenians, as the years roll on, seek to winhis favor with sacrifices of bulls and rams. (Iliad 2.546–551)

And:

So saying, f lashing-eyed Athena departed over the barren sea and left lovelyScheria. She came to Marathon and broad-wayed Athens, and entered the wellbuilthouse of Erechtheus. (Odyssey 7.78–81)

The great palaces of Mycenae, Tiryns, and Pylos all show signs of violent destructionand burning, attributed in antiquity to the arrival of the Dorian Greeks from the north. Thecollapse of the Late Bronze Age, or Mycenaean, civilization led to several centuries of whatare referred to as the Dark Ages, a time when the level of material culture fell dramatically.There are no more palaces with ornate frescoes, nor any other monumental buildings, nomassive fortifications, and few examples of the extraordinary objects of gold, silver, ivory,bronze, ostrich egg, lapis lazuli, and other precious materials which were deposited inBronze Age tombs. Also lost was the ability to write: Linear B texts cease and there are nosigns of literacy for almost five hundred years. The tradition for Athens is that the Dorianspassed by Attica, turning aside to enter the Peloponnese. Because later activity has obliteratedall traces of a palace on the Acropolis, we do not know how or when it came to an end.

Whatever the case, it is clear that the city shared fully in the Dark Ages which followedthe destruction of the Bronze Age palaces elsewhere. Cemeteries from the end of theBronze Age have been found on the nearby island of Salamis and at Perati, on the east coastof Attica. Six hundred individuals were buried at Perati in 279 graves in a cemetery used forabout a century between 1200 and 1100 B.C. In Athens itself a handful of wells and somevery poor graves are all that survive from the years around 1100 to 1000. To this period canbe dated the first use of the area later known as the Kerameikos, northwest of the Agora, asa burial ground; in the historical period the Kerameikos developed into the premier cemeteryof Athens.

In the words of Sean L. Yom, “civil society has become a normative football in the Arab discourse.[2]” What is meant by that is the fact that, on the one hand, the term is instrumentalized by public officials in order to garner support for their projects of mobilization and “modernization.” Alternatively, Islamists make use of the term so that they carve out a legitimate share of the public space. Finally, independent activists employ it with the purpose of calling for the expansion of the boundaries of individual liberties.

A middle-of-the-way approach is provided by the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo that defines civil society as “the place where a mélange of groups, associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations and unions come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen.[3]” What follows is that civil society organizations must be “secular in ideology, civil in their behavior, legally recognized and supportive of democratic reform.[4]” Therefore, this second definition proves to be more functional in that it provides the generic criteria according to which civil society organizations can be identified. Several types of organizations that meet these standards can be listed:

• Membership-based professional groups, i.e. syndicates of lawyers, doctors, engineers. They usually enjoy large and influential rosters.
• NGOs that provide social services and call for the expansion of associational and media freedoms. They perceive themselves as the front line of political change.
• Public interest advocates, i.e. human rights activists, women’s movements, think tanks. They embody the Western principles of a sound civic involvement in what regards fair elections and civil liberties in political life.
• Unions
• Informal social groups, i.e. cooperative societies, youth leagues, mutual-aid networks that are community-focused and gather support among the poor. They are regarded by the UN as “the richest source of civic vitality in the Arab world, guiding citizens with an invisible social hand.[5]”

All this diversity of the fabric of the Arab civil society seems to herald the fact that a consistent path towards democracy is being taken in the region. At this point, two seminal observations need to be strongly emphasized: one is a crucial conclusion that scholars of democratization have reached; the other is a corollary of how semi-authoritarian systems actually work. Both warn against a simplistic assumption that might mislead analysts into interpreting the boom in the number of civil society organizations as being indicative of a strong bottom-up surge meant to challenge Middle Eastern regimes. Quoting Yom, “despite this brisk civic revival, authoritarian governments appear no closer to downfall than before.[6]”

Two are the reasons that account for this paradoxical situation. Firstly, CSOs have failed to mobilize a substantial mass of supporters across the society. This malfunction results from the fact that most CSOs are animated by single issues that cannot raise widespread support because they only address certain niches of the society. What is more, the divide-and-rule strategy applied by the semi-authoritarian regimes is perfectly at work, since CSOs do not manage to develop cross-sector coalitions and therefore accentuate the cycles of “dissonant politics.”

Besides the weak grassroots support and the endemic fragmentation, another factor further complicates the equation: the increase in the number of voluntary religious associations that have an Islamist core. These associations prevail in terms of capacity, breadth of their concerns and ardent grassroots support, thus succeeding to fill the void left by the state’s pulling out in many social issues. Scholars note that “they have Islamized Arab societies through the back door, penetrating educational institutions, the language of politics and even other CSOs, thereby giving citizens their real sense of political participation.[7]”

The issue of Islamist revival is an utmost significant one, particularly because it poses a serious dilemma regarding the nature of their principles (some do not deny they would impose theocracy and expel minorities) and the nature of their programs. On the other hand, it is precisely their efficacy and the fact that they constitute the strongest opposition against the ruling elite that makes them impossible to be overlooked when referring to democratization. Consequently, an entire sub-chapter will be dedicated to this subject further on.

Putting it all in a nutshell, the issue of which organizations do make up the Arab civil society is an extremely sensitive one: if Islamist organizations do not count, the civic segment is weak and fragmented, with little power to press the regimes for significant reforms. Conversely, if Islamists are after all included, the Arab street appears animated and vigorous, with a potential leverage on the state structures. Therefore, policy-makers absolutely need to pay heed to this dichotomous phenomenon and ascertain that “Arab civil society consists of numerous interests and associations that fluctuate across countries and sectors.[8]”

This conclusion will prove extremely useful for the analysis that I will undertake in the second part of this paper. Taking into consideration the indeterminate composition of the Arab civil society, assessing the impact of the US infusion of funds in this sector will prove even more demanding. Additionally, the thesis according to which civil society regeneration is a sine-qua-non of democratization will be scrutinized, as well as the control mechanisms employed by the semi-authoritarian regimes.

[1] Larry DIAMOND et al, Cum se consolideaza democratia, Ed. Polirom, Iasi 2004, p.32

[2] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9,  No. 4, Article 2 – December  2005, p. 7

[3] Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, Annual Report 2004, p.3,  Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Cairo, Egypt, http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/reports/reportsmain.htm, retrieved from the Internet January 7, 2006

[4] Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, Annual Report 2004, p.4,  Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Cairo, Egypt, http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/reports/reportsmain.htm, retrieved from the Internet January 7, 2006

[5] UNDP Arab Development Report, 2004, p.137, http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr2.cfm?menu=12, retrieved from the Internet January 8, 2006

[6] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9,  No. 4, Article 2 – December  2005, p.11

[7] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9,  No. 4, Article 2 – December  2005, p.12

[8] UNDP Arab Development Report, 2004, p.214, http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr2.cfm?menu=12, retrieved from the Internet January 8, 2006

Alternatively, this section will touch upon one of the most widespread assumptions regarding the Middle East today, an assumption that joins up both scholars and policy-makers in their belief that “the vigorous civic activism can generate democratic regime change.[1]” To be more specific, those theoretically and/or practically concerned with Middle Eastern issues, extol the “magic” of a chain reaction that is thought to be the key to democratization in the Middle East: a vigorous associational life holds the huge potential of defying authoritarian establishments, thus forcing the state to adopt liberal reform and setting off the process of democratic transition.

Indeed, interpreting the regional parade of “people power” as a signal that the “snowball effect” has already been triggered, “Western scholars, development agencies, and policy makers reason that if Arab civil society organizations continue to pressure their authoritarian governments for meaningful reforms, then political transformation will ripple around the region.[2]”  This translated in practice into consistent financial support provided by international institutions such as the World Bank, the UNDP, the EC (“the Barcelona process”) and USAID, all converging on the very same plank that sustaining opposition from below will generate regime shifts from above.

Nonetheless, this enthusiastic perspective needs to be lucidly tempered by a connection to the survival strategies of semi-authoritarian regimes that are thus constructed so as to display an appearance of liberalization, while in reality “they remain robust in their will and capacity to repress.[3]” This deceptive mechanism will be explained in detail as follows next posts.

[1] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9,  No. 4, Article 2 – December  2005,  p. 1

[2] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9,  No. 4, Article 2 – December  2005,  p. 3

[3] Anoushiravan EHTESHAMI, Is the Middle East Democratizing?, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, no. 26 (2), February 1999, p. 7

The land of Attica has been inhabited since at least the Upper Paleolithic period (30,000–10,000 B.C.), when humans hunted and gathered their food. Early traces from this time have been found in the Kitsos cave near Laureion and in chance finds elsewhere of early stone tools.

Sometime around 6000 B.C. the Neolithic period began with the introduction of cultivated grains and domesticated animals. These new advances appear in Greece relatively quickly, and it is usually assumed therefore that they were developed elsewhere, presumably in the Middle East, and imported into Greece. The changes allowed for a larger and more settled population.

Evidence of human activity in the Neolithic period has been uncovered at various sites in Attica, particularly in caves. At Oinoe near Marathon, excavation of one such cave produced large amounts of pottery of the Middle Neolithic period (5000–4000). At Nea Makri, at the south end of the plain of Marathon, excavations have revealed part of a settlement of several very modest houses of Middle Neolithic date, along with a stretch of the earliest known street in Attica.

In Athens itself excavation suggests that the shallow caves and overhangs of the Acropolis rock were used primarily in the latest Neolithic period (3000–2800), a time when the use of caves was widespread throughout Greece. The Klepsydra Spring just below the caves on the northwest slope of the Acropolis hill was also exploited

at this time, when twenty-two shallow wells were cut into the soft bedrock.

As President G.W. Bush has repeated on numerous occasions, “The United States possesses unprecedented- and unequaled- strength and influence in the world.[1]” This powerful assertion is tantamount to the fact that, in terms of system-level, the unipolar configuration of the international setting has shaped a permissive environment for the US. To be more precise, a world in which the American power prevails makes possible a massive material expansion that will further accentuate the asymmetrical dominance (the positive feedback effect). The scholar Robert Jervis has synthesized this equation as follows: “The forceful and unilateral exercise of US power is not simply the by-product of 9/11…It is the logical outcome of the current unrivalled position in the international system.[2]”

From this perspective then, 9/11 becomes, in terms of International Relations analysis, an opportunity for the projection of US power. Monten develops this point by asserting that the 9/11 events were thus instrumentalized so as to reverse the perception about the use of force at the domestic level, and to provide a palpable materialization of US strength and will at the international level[3].

After having outlined the permissive factor, I will go on to discuss the second level, namely the domestic one. Both in theory and practice, the Bush doctrine bears the unmistakable stamp of the neoconservative ideology. To quote George Soros, “the Neocons constitute an influential group within the executive and their influence has increased even more after 9/11.[4]”

The manifesto of the Neocon group, entitled “Project for the New American Century. Statement of Principles” delineates their quintessential principles that are definitely worth expounding. First and foremost, in the Neoconservative perspective, International Relations are primarily power relations, in which law only serves to legitimate the dominating position. Furthermore, this dominating position entitles the respective state (in our case, the US) to impose its vision upon other states. The rationale for such an assertion is that the US perspective is useful for the world at large because the American model has proved its efficiency and superiority. As President G.W. Bush was emphasizing in 2006 in the State of the Union Address, “we are the nation that saved liberty in Europe, and liberated death camps, and helped raise up democracies, and faced down an evil empire.[5]” “The only alternative to American leadership is a dramatically more dangerous and anxious world.[6]”

Moreover, the Neoconservative ideology is permeated by what Monten has called “liberal optimism”. This optimism is manifest in the assumptions that (1) “states can be compelled to embrace liberty because it is unlikely that they themselves would choose a competing political model and (2) the belief that the US traditional political values and institutions are universal and exportable.[7]” The comments that can be raised at this stage address nuances that will prove to be essential in the following chapters. Firstly, when affirming that “states will embrace liberty”, we are still very far from the stated goal, that of democratization. This crucial difference between liberation and democratization will constitute a key-element in explaining the US lack of success in achieving its goal in the Middle East.

Secondly, what is “universal and exportable” is the core principles upon which the American state was founded (as De Tocqueville was pointing out), not the particular shape that democracy took in the US. I underline this point, because the syntagm “democracy export” is rather risky, since it does not seem to leave much space for diversity within the democracy model.  And the risk is even higher in a context of violent debate and misleading theses about the “clash of civilizations” and the incompatibility between certain cultures and democracy.

The key-ingredients of the Neoconservative ideology include: (1 “a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges”, (2); “a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad” and a (3) “national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.[8]” In order to shed more light upon the Neocon influence on the Bush doctrine I will proceed to the discourse analysis of several fundamental speeches delivered by G.W. Bush from 2001 onwards, as well as data that will constitute additional evidence.

(1) Military supremacy: As stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy, “the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength.[9]”

In order to maintain the position of the most redoubtable military power, “the U.S. military budget request by the Bush Administration for Fiscal Year 2007 equals $462.7 billion. This request is however separate from the requests of funding for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq- $70 billion for Fiscal Year 2006, on top of the $50 billion approved by Congress[10]”. A more clear understanding of these figures becomes available if we place them in the context of military spending in the world. According to the Center of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “the US military spending was almost two-fifths of the world spending and almost 29 times as large as the combined spending of the six “rogue” states (Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria).[11]”

Source: U.S. Military Spending vs. the World, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, February 6, 2006, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/archives/002244.php. retrieved from the Internet May 2, 2006

Analysts also point to the fact that although the US spending has decreased as compared to the Cold War era, it is still close to Cold War levels[12]. This may be connected with the line promoted by the Bush Doctrine that draws a parallel between the past threat of Communism and the present threat of terrorism: “The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism.  Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion.  Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar:  intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression[13].

(2) Bold Foreign Policy: One of G.W. Bush’s statements clearly outlines the crucial input of the US at the level of the international arena: “We’ve reached another great turning point- and the resolve we show will shape the next stage of the world democratic movement.” The complement of this pronouncement is comprised in the National Security Strategy: “The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.” Finally, from the same NSS we find out that “The aim of this strategy is to make this world not just safe, but better.”

Drawing the bottom line, what we can infer from these declarations is that: the US is the unchallenged leader of democracy promotion, the substance of the democracy promotion process is derived from the US national values and interests, and that the US is also in the position to decide upon the strategy that will make the world “better” (the latter term being a value judgment that expresses the US authority in deciding the significance of “better”).

These are also instances of the liberal optimism that was discussed above, since they express the belief in the benign nature of US power. In other words, since the US is the “favored, elect people, mandated with a leadership mission, it follows that the US power can be exercised without the risk of abuse or domination.[14].” Moreover, this preeminent position of world leader is also translated in the fact that when the US acts to promote its own interest, it simultaneously serves the interest of the international system: “Our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity[15].” In more concrete terms, Condoleeza Rice’s declaration that “invading Iraq is critical to reestablishing the bona fides of the UN Security Council[16]” follows the same line of a country that places itself at the vanguard of international relations.

[1] George W. BUSH, National Security Strategy, The White House, September 17, 2002; www.state.gov, retrieved from the Internet on February 5, 2006

[2] Robert JERVIS, The Compulsive Empire, Foreign Policy, no. 137, July/August 2003, p.82

[3] Jonathan MONTEN, The Roots of the Bush Doctrine, International Security, Spring 2005, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 154-155

[4] George SOROS, Suprematia americana; un balon de sapun, Editura Antet XX Press, Bucuresti, 2004, p. 12

[5] George W. BUSH, State of the Union Address, United States Capitol, Washington D.C., January 31, 2006, www.state.gov, retrieved from the Internet  on February 5, 2006

[6] George W. BUSH, State of the Union Address, United States Capitol, Washington D.C., January 31, 2006, www.state.gov, retrieved from the Internet  on February 5, 2006

[7] Jonathan MONTEN, The Roots of the Bush Doctrine, International Security, Spring 2005, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 130-133

[8]Project for the New American Century- Statement of Principles, June 3, 1997, http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm, retrieved from the Internet January 20, 2006

[9] George W. BUSH, National Security Strategy, The White House, September 17, 2002; www.state.gov, retrieved from the Internet on February 5, 2006

[10] Anup SHAH, US Military Spending, March 27, 2006, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp, retrieved from the Internet May 2, 2006

[11] Anup SHAH, US Military Spending, March 27, 2006, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp, retrieved from the Internet May 2, 2006

[12] Anup SHAH, US Military Spending, March 27, 2006, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp, retrieved from the Internet May 2, 2006

[13] George W. BUSH, US National Security Strategy, March 2006, www.state.gov, retrieved from the Internet March 17, 2006

[14] Jonathan MONTEN, The Roots of the Bush Doctrine, International Security, Spring 2005, vol. 20, no. 4, p. 137

[15] George W. BUSH, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html, retrieved from the Internet March 19, 2006

[16] Condoleeza RICE, Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no.1, January-February 2000, p.3