In the renowned work on democracy consolidation coordinated by Larry Diamond, civil society is defined as “a sphere of organized intermediary groups that are voluntary, self-generated, independent from the state and family and interconnected by a legal order and a set of common rules.[1]” Indeed, this comprehensive working-definition does have the merit of laying the theoretical ground for the subsequent discussion. Nevertheless, the practical reality reveals the fact that such a plain division of state and non-state actors, of public and private spheres cannot be operated that easily when it comes to the Middle Eastern reality.
In the words of Sean L. Yom, “civil society has become a normative football in the Arab discourse.[2]” What is meant by that is the fact that, on the one hand, the term is instrumentalized by public officials in order to garner support for their projects of mobilization and “modernization.” Alternatively, Islamists make use of the term so that they carve out a legitimate share of the public space. Finally, independent activists employ it with the purpose of calling for the expansion of the boundaries of individual liberties.
A middle-of-the-way approach is provided by the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo that defines civil society as “the place where a mélange of groups, associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations and unions come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen.[3]” What follows is that civil society organizations must be “secular in ideology, civil in their behavior, legally recognized and supportive of democratic reform.[4]” Therefore, this second definition proves to be more functional in that it provides the generic criteria according to which civil society organizations can be identified. Several types of organizations that meet these standards can be listed:
- Membership-based professional groups, i.e. syndicates of lawyers, doctors, engineers. They usually enjoy large and influential rosters.
- NGOs that provide social services and call for the expansion of associational and media freedoms. They perceive themselves as the front line of political change.
- Public interest advocates, i.e. human rights activists, women’s movements, think tanks. They embody the Western principles of a sound civic involvement in what regards fair elections and civil liberties in political life.
- Unions
- Informal social groups, i.e. cooperative societies, youth leagues, mutual-aid networks that are community-focused and gather support among the poor. They are regarded by the UN as “the richest source of civic vitality in the Arab world, guiding citizens with an invisible social hand.[5]”
All this diversity of the fabric of the Arab civil society seems to herald the fact that a consistent path towards democracy is being taken in the region. At this point, two seminal observations need to be strongly emphasized: one is a crucial conclusion that scholars of democratization have reached; the other is a corollary of how semi-authoritarian systems actually work. Both warn against a simplistic assumption that might mislead analysts into interpreting the boom in the number of civil society organizations as being indicative of a strong bottom-up surge meant to challenge Middle Eastern regimes. Quoting Yom, “despite this brisk civic revival, authoritarian governments appear no closer to downfall than before.[6]”
Two are the reasons that account for this paradoxical situation. Firstly, CSOs have failed to mobilize a substantial mass of supporters across the society. This malfunction results from the fact that most CSOs are animated by single issues that cannot raise widespread support because they only address certain niches of the society. What is more, the divide-and-rule strategy applied by the semi-authoritarian regimes is perfectly at work, since CSOs do not manage to develop cross-sector coalitions and therefore accentuate the cycles of “dissonant politics.”
Besides the weak grassroots support and the endemic fragmentation, another factor further complicates the equation: the increase in the number of voluntary religious associations that have an Islamist core. These associations prevail in terms of capacity, breadth of their concerns and ardent grassroots support, thus succeeding to fill the void left by the state’s pulling out in many social issues. Scholars note that “they have Islamized Arab societies through the back door, penetrating educational institutions, the language of politics and even other CSOs, thereby giving citizens their real sense of political participation.[7]”
The issue of Islamist revival is an utmost significant one, particularly because it poses a serious dilemma regarding the nature of their principles (some do not deny they would impose theocracy and expel minorities) and the nature of their programs. On the other hand, it is precisely their efficacy and the fact that they constitute the strongest opposition against the ruling elite that makes them impossible to be overlooked when referring to democratization. Consequently, an entire sub-chapter will be dedicated to this subject further on.
Putting it all in a nutshell, the issue of which organizations do make up the Arab civil society is an extremely sensitive one: if Islamist organizations do not count, the civic segment is weak and fragmented, with little power to press the regimes for significant reforms. Conversely, if Islamists are after all included, the Arab street appears animated and vigorous, with a potential leverage on the state structures. Therefore, policy-makers absolutely need to pay heed to this dichotomous phenomenon and ascertain that “Arab civil society consists of numerous interests and associations that fluctuate across countries and sectors.[8]”
This conclusion will prove extremely useful for the analysis that I will undertake in the second part of this paper. Taking into consideration the indeterminate composition of the Arab civil society, assessing the impact of the US infusion of funds in this sector will prove even more demanding. Additionally, the thesis according to which civil society regeneration is a sine-qua-non of democratization will be scrutinized, as well as the control mechanisms employed by the semi-authoritarian regimes.
[1] Larry DIAMOND et al, Cum se consolideaza democratia, Ed. Polirom, Iasi 2004, p.32
[2] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9, No. 4, Article 2 – December 2005, p. 7
[3] Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, Annual Report 2004, p.3, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Cairo, Egypt, http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/reports/reportsmain.htm, retrieved from the Internet January 7, 2006
[4] Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, Annual Report 2004, p.4, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Cairo, Egypt, http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/reports/reportsmain.htm, retrieved from the Internet January 7, 2006
[5] UNDP Arab Development Report, 2004, p.137, http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr2.cfm?menu=12, retrieved from the Internet January 8, 2006
[6] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9, No. 4, Article 2 – December 2005, p.11
[7] Sean L. YOM, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, The Middle east Review of International Affairs, Volume 9, No. 4, Article 2 – December 2005, p.12
[8] UNDP Arab Development Report, 2004, p.214, http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr2.cfm?menu=12, retrieved from the Internet January 8, 2006
