The Bush Doctrine

The present article discusses the most prominent lines of what has come to be hailed “the Bush doctrin, by proceeding in the following manner: it starts with the broader picture of the two Foreign Policy contradictory strands that have traversed the US history (idealism and interventionism), so as to identify which of them most impacts on the current US Foreign Policy.

The deep-rooted belief in US exceptionalism has such a wide scope that it can simultaneously accommodate two antagonistic standpoints: idealism and interventionism (also called exemplarism and vindicationism).

Probably the phrase that best encapsulates this dichotomy is “the US as both beacon and crusader” (Henry Kissinger). Indeed, Kissinger underscores in his renowned “Diplomacy” that two contradictory attitudes have alternatively funneled the US Foreign Policy throughout time. “The first is that the US best serves its own values by perfecting democracy at home, acting as a beacon for the rest of the world; the second, that the US values require that it lead a world crusade on their behalf.”

The “beacon paradigm” purports that the influence upon the world should be exerted predominantly through the force of example. It stems from the credo that once democratic institutions are properly shaped (so as to oppose state-centralization tendencies) and subsequently strengthened, the efficacy of the system would “radiate” outside the US borders, inspiring other states to adopt similar models. The element that is most relevant for the topic of this article is that this exemplaristic paradigm is profoundly skeptical about the US ability to promote democracy abroad. The premise behind this inherent skepticism is that, democracy being fragile and difficult to propagate, an outside initiative of exporting it may prove counterproductive.

Alternatively, the “crusader paradigm” calls for active measures meant to spread the US values and institutions. It is for this reason that the paradigm also bears the name of “vindicationism”, derived from the conviction that “the US must actively use its power to vindicate the right in an otherwise illiberal world”. In contrast to exemplarism, which is rather distrustful of the possibility to engender gradual change, vindicationism is optimistic about the perspective of achieving qualitative change through assertive action.

In this sense, President Bush’s credo as expressed in the 2006 National Security Strategy is most telling:” We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.”

Monten actually identifies within vindicationism a pattern of what he calls “liberal optimism”. As further assessments will reveal, this type of liberal optimism is the main engine in the implementation of the Bush doctrine, since it nurtures the belief that assertive action (in our case, war) can remove illiberal barriers and thus almost automatically ignite a spontaneous stream of democracy.

In practice, this ideological controversy has generated a perpetual vacillation between isolationism and engagement, although, as Kissinger notes, “after the end of WW II, interdependence relations have started prevailing.”

As pointed out above, the substance of these two paradigms is contrasting- yet there is an initial point of junction: the agreement upon US exceptionalism. According to this enshrined principle, “democracy promotion is central to US political identity and sense of national purpose.” To quote Alexis de Tocqueville, “the principles on which the American constitutions rest, those principles of order, of the balance of powers, of true liberty, of deep and sincere respect for right, are indispensable to all republics; they ought to be common to all (…).”

The discussion about American democratic values and their exemplary character has a longstanding tradition. Yet what is of utmost interest for the purpose of this paper is that this credo constitutes the very intersection of the “beacon and crusader” paradigms. Supporters of both sides argue that the providential context in which the American values were bred and their subsequent efficiency in shaping a liberal society, turn the US prototype into one which should be replicated by other states. What is more, according to Monten, the US credo of exceptionalism is turned into“Foreign Policy nationalism”. In other words, “Foreign Policy reflects the liberal political values that define and distinguish the US.”

Yet the moot point where the two start diverging is the precise policy means, namely the contention about what is the optimal procedure of democracy promotion. From this level on, the two paradigms produce two differing policies that obviously employ contrasting instruments. Certainly, I do not intend to put forward a Manichean division of exemplarism and vindicationism, all the more as the political rhetoric seriously blurs this distinction (G.W. Bush states in the recently released National Security Strategy:”Like the policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, our approach is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them”). Furthermore, I cannot overlook the fact that, more often than not, the Foreign Policy adopted by a certain administration “borrows” elements from both paradigms. However, the premise I start from is that the preponderance with which certain tools are employed instead of others does point to an overwhelming influence of one of the two paradigms.

In the case of the Bush doctrine, the source of influence is easily identifiable, given the strong vehemence with which the Administration holds on the “crusader” vision. This conclusion is immediately evident in the text of the State of the Union Address 2006 by President Bush: “There is no peace in retreat. And there is no honour in retreat. (…) America rejects the false comfort of isolationism(…) Once again, we accept the call of history to deliver the oppressed and move the world toward peace.”

What is more, the most recent National Security Strategy conveys an even more mobilizing message, by forcefully stressing the drawbacks of isolationism as demonstrated by history: “America now faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear – isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment – appeals to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities. Yet history teaches that every time American leaders have taken this path, the challenges have only increased and the missed opportunities have left future generations less secure.”